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ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD

Reflections on Expropriation and the
Future of Investment in the Americas
This writer's experience in the private area of investment in developing
countries derives from three distinct periods and roles-first in private
practice, then in United States government service, and then in academic
life. Whether these varieties of legal experiences add up to a coherent
whole is questionable. But looking at the problem from three different
angles over time may provide some viewpoints not apparent to those with a
more constant perspective.

In private practice in the late 1950s, one of the recurring tasks of
international lawyers was to try to search for ways to increase security of
investments in less developed countries (to use the euphemism of that
decade), and to try to come up with disincentives for large-scale expropriations. It is not clear how one should evaluate the result of those
endeavors-certainly nothing that any private lawyer did in New York or
London or Paris or Amsterdam deterred a Sukarno or a Castro. On the
other hand, those years did see the beginning of a gradual realignment in
the perception of the relations between alien investors and host countries.
The position of investors .in foreign countries was seen somewhat less in
terms of property rights-eternal and immutable-and more in terms of a
continuously changing contractual relationship, in some ways like a collective bargaining agreement.
II
In the Legal Adviser's office of the United States State Department in
the early 1960s, there were three missions concerned with foreign investment in Latin America-(I) encouraging new investments, (2) defendMr. Lowenfeld is a Professor of Law, New York University Law School: LL.B.,
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ing existing investments, and (3) protecting United States policy from the
consequences of investment disputes. The conflict among these three missions is not generally appreciated-certainly was not appreciated at the
time.
This was the period not just of Camelot, but of genuine optimism, and
genuine dedication to the cause of bettering the economic standards of
what were now called 'the developing countries'. It was a mixture, of
course, of generosity and self-interest. But the New Frontier, from the
President down, believed that misery bred revolution, whereas economic
growth, political democracy, and social justice would reinforce one another
in the march toward attainment of our common ideals.
How could economic growth be achieved? The figures were less encouraging than the slogans. However one counted-whether in terms of the
movement of prices of primary products compared with prices of necessary
imports, or in terms of income or GNP per capita, or the overall share of
the world's capital, the developing countries' outlook was gloomy. But try
we must, sustained perhaps by the analogy of the postwar recovery of
Europe. At Punta del Este in August of 1961, the countries of the Western
Hemisphere were led by the United States to pledge themselves to a rate
of economic growth for each country in Latin America of not less than 2.5
per cent per capita per year.'
No one quite knew what this minimum goal would require in the way of
transfer of resources from the developed countries, but by any count the
sum was enormous-somewhere between $5 and $20 billion per year.
Whatever the precise amount, it was clear that no foreign aid program
depending solely on public funds, whether by the United States alone, by
the international community in whatever manner mobilized, or by some
combination of national and multinational effort, was likely to sustain a
2
resource transfer of that order of magnitude over a decade.
The answer? In the minds of United States policy-makers-private
investment. And this answer was doubly attractive, in that private investment could accomplish not only a transfer of capital, but could, at the
same time, accomplish a transfer of technology and know-how, and also
provide export markets. By putting the equation this way:
Need - public funds = private investment;

'Charter of Punta del Este Establishing an Alliance for Progress within the Framework
Pan America. 45 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 463 (1961).
of Operation
2

See, e.g., Agency for International Development, Foreign Aid through Private Initiative, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN FOREIGN AID
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it is not intended to suggest that the designers of our aid policy in the early
sixties were wholly naive. They worried about "investment climate" and
they designed a variety of protective mantles against the disagreeable
winds blowing from the south. They developed the investment guarantee
program, for instance; they supported local partnerships; and they promoted the use of intermediaries, such as IFC or local development banks.
The idea of private investment as the device to fill the resource gap not
only did not work, but led to a continuing and self-reinforcing series of
misunderstandings. For one thing, business was likely to go where the
greatest hope for profit lay-or at least the most favorable combination of
high profit and low risk. That, after all, is the business of business. But
there was no reasonable expectation that investment made on this calculation would go to countries with the greatest need, or (in those countries
where it did go) to the industries with the greatest promises of developing
the local economy.
But even leaving that point aside, the coupling of private foreign investment in developing countries with the explicit foreign aid goals of
United States policy did not ring true, just when economic ambition and
nationalism were rising up in nearly all the developing countries. Foreign
investment had been going on in Latin America for several generations,
with no particular identification with United States government purposes.
The benefits to host countries, while in some cases considerable, seemed to
have been by-products rather than principal goals, and in any event were
seen as equivocal.
Looking back now from the vantage point of the 1970s, the confusion
of motives seems inevitable. (1) Private investment was seen as hypocritical in its latter-day pose as an instrument of economic betterment of the
host country; and (2) the aid-giving countries-particularly the United
States-were accused of being interested primarily in protecting their nationals' private investments and only secondarily in economic development. Both points were often reinforced by the inconsistent responses to
the dilemma facing any aid program-whether to support established institutions or to try to replace them.
Inevitably, then, the issue of encouraging new investments blended into
the problem of protecting existing investments-the second of the three
missions mentioned above. Whenever-or at least so it seemed-an investor was threatened with a take-over or was denied a license to do
something he had been doing, or was subjected to new and burdensome
taxes, he or his counsel would come to the State Department for support.
Sometimes the approach was made to the regional bureau or assistant
secretary, sometimes to the Bureau of Economic Affairs, sometimes to
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. I
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AID, and sometimes to the seventh floor. Eventually, however, most
situations of this kind involved some type of contractual or statutory claim,
and more likely than not they landed in the Legal Adviser's office.
How should an American government lawyer deal with such a situation?
One way might be to say: "We deal only with international law violations;
an international law violation occurs when you have exhausted your local
remedies; and until you have done this, just keep us on your mailing list."
A variation of that attitude might be to say, (where applicable) that the
investor has given up his right to protection of his home country -either by
incorporating in the country of investment, or by signing a contract with a
provision undertaking to forego all diplomatic protection by his own government (the so-called Calvo Clause), or by investing in a country which
has a form of the Calvo Clause as part of its law or constitution. But any
response along these lines, at least at the first stage, is out of the question
today for any government reasonably responsive and responsible to its
citizens. Quite apart from scholastic arguments about the validity of the
Calvo Clause-whether for instance a citizen can ever waive the right of
his government to present a claim-the Calvo doctrine or the exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine are without practical meaning. When an investor
looks to his government for help in circumstances such as those described,
the first disposition of his government will be to do what it can. Not only
will the investor's government not decline to do what it can for its citizens-within limits, of course; the host government will not in the author's
experience raise technical arguments along the above lines if the investor's
government begins to take an interest in the dispute.
What, then, can the investor's government-typically the United
States-do in such a situation? Various pressures can be brought to
bear-aid, commodity agreements, political arrangements, and so on.
Where a dispute is about money, intervention on the part of the investor's
government, if done quietly, may play a decisive role. For the lawyer-whether private or in government-an important role is to try to do
the opposite of what we learned in law school-that is not to look for the
principle to be derived from a particular dispute, but to look for a particular
issue that can be compromised, renegotiated or paid for without either
agreement on or compromise of principle.
Of course, when the dispute is really one of principle, there is little the
government can do-with or without a lawyer. The contrast between the
situation of the copper companies in Chile in the mid-1960s and today
illustrates the point. When President Frei was elected on the platform of
Chileanization, it proved possible to work out an arrangement to preserve
everyone's position of principle, and at the same time-by no means
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. I
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incidentally-to strengthen United States foreign policy in Chile. Used in
an affirmative way, our foreign aid tools, including Ex-Im credits and
investment guarantees, both protected a major investment by United
States-based enterprises and promoted the foreign policy interests of the
United States-seen at that time as supporting left-of-center Christian
democracy throughout Latin America. In this writer's view, contrary to
what has been written by some of the revisionist critics of United States
policy, the foreign policy goal was probably more important than the
protection of an existing investment in persuading the United States government to become the third partner in the Chileanization program. When
the conflicts of principle became irreconcilable, however, as happened after
1970, there seemed to be no further use in looking for details, such as
trying to convert equity to debt or establishing joint venture operations, or
arranging management contracts or whatever. And certainly negative use
of foreign aid - whether or not justified on other counts - is going to have
no value in protecting the investment or changing the host country's mind.
This brings us to the third of the missions in this area as a government
official-the preservation of foreign policy interests of the United States
from the effects of investment disputes. It is hardly necessary, in this
audience of professionals, to talk at length about the Hickenlooper Amendment.3 Only two brief points need be made here: (1) Even the Hickenlooper Amendment did not say "Aid will be cut off for any country that
expropriates ..... " What it said-that is what could muster a majority in the
Congress-was "aid will be cut off for any country that expropriates and
has not within 6 months of such action taken appropriate steps to discharge
its obligations under international law." The mandatory character of the
amendment, in contrast to most of the other restrictions on aid which could
be waived by the President, 4 meant that every dispute over an investment,
however small-and some of them were indeed small-potentially involved
an important tool for conducting the foreign policy of the United States.
Indeed, as suggested in the preceeding discussion, an investment dispute
with a country might well prejudice measures taken in connection with
other, more important investment disputes. Just as juries .in England would
acquit thieves rather than send them to the gallows, so the Hickenlooper
Amendment induced on the part of the United States government lawyers
great caution about ever speaking out, ever taking sides in investment
disputes. They found, as many of you know, a variety of ways of in3

§620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 2370(e) (1970).
See, e.g., § 620(a)(b)(c)(d)(f)(j)(p)(q). The non-waiver provision of the Hickenlooper
Amendment was subsequently incorporated into some of the other provisions- e.g.
§ 620(g)(i)(k); for the general waiver authority, see§ 614(a).
4
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terpreting the words "appropriate steps," or "obligation under international
law." After a while, as one of the author's colleagues is fond of saying
about faculty meetings, there were lots of cases but no law.
III
The author left the State Department in 1966, before the recent changes
in direction in Peru and Chile, and for the past six years he has been
thinking about the problem of private investment in developing countries
from the luxury of a professor's chair. In a way, that has turned out to be
the most difficult assignment, because there was neither a client nor a boss
nor any categorical imperative to serve as a guide. One may believe (as this
writer does) in economic development, and (at least for the countries that
he knows something about) in private enterprise. One may also continue to
believe in foreign aid, though perhaps not with the confidence and optimism of a decade ago. But at least to this observer, there is a good deal of
doubt about President Nixon's statement, as part of his updating of the
Hickenlooper principle early this year, that "a sort of symbiosis exists-with government aid efforts not only speeding the flow of, but actually depending for their success upon, private capital, both domestic and
foreign. "5
President Nixon may be right when he says that actions impairing the
contractual rights or seizing the assets of foreign investors are "wasteful
from a resource standpoint." He may even be right, simply in terms of the
priorities that he sees for the United States today, that foreign aid does not
seem so attractive in the face of expropriations and similar acts. It does not
follow, however, that the conditions for private investments of the kind he
advocates exist today in the Western Hemisphere.6
Whether one is content to recite principles of international law developed in an earlier age, or like President Nixon, one says to the developing
countries, in effect, "I know what is good for you," the result seems to be
about the same. We cannot change the receptivity of the hemisphere to
private investment by cost-benefit analysis. One would hope however that
doubt about conditions for private investment would not erode the willingness of developed countries to dedicate a portion of their resources to
public assistance of some sort-whether bilateral or multilateral.
There may be some small contributions that we can make as lawyers.
We may, for example, try to separate the question of public v. private
5

Policy Statement on Economic Assistance and Investment Security in Developing

Countries, Jan. 19, 1972, 8 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 64 (1972).
6
Compare, e.g., Schliesser, Recent Developments in Latin-American Foreign Investment
Laws 6 INT'L LAWYER 64 (1972).
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ownership from the question of national v. alien ownership. This is, in a
sense, what Mexico has done. It is only fair to point out, however, that
Mexicanization as understood today is taking place a full generation (or,
depending on one's definition, two generations) following the revolution in
that country. Whether, as has been suggested, international financial institutions should take up this idea-for example by financing the purchase
by local nationals of enterprises owned from abroad-may be worth thinking about. Speaking from the stacks of the library, all this writer can do is
to summarize briefly the results of the study undertaken by the Inter-American Law Center of Columbia University which focused expressly
on expropriation within the countries covered, rather than on transnational
issues. 7
It turns out that even excluding entirely the problem of alien ownership,
in an age of social change, discontent, and rejection of old values, the
classical view of property embodied in the civil codes of nineteenth century
Europe and Latin America, no longer holds up-at least in the big cases.
When the traditional doctrines get in the way of political movements-left
or right, violent or peaceful-they tend one way or another to be cast aside.
Whether there is a constitutional amendment or a special agrarian law, or a
technique of valuation known to be unrealistic, or a re-definition of 'cash
payment'-the relation of the state to private property developed when
property was supreme and the state was modest, does not survive the
recasting of the state as the principal focus of values.
Property, in nearly all the countries we looked at, is said to have a
"social function." The definition of that term is, as one might expect, not
clear. It is clear, however, that to call transfer of major industries from
private to public ownership illegal, is to rely on a law that is no longer firm.
The foreign investor is a special case-in some ways more vulnerable, in
others more protected. But nowhere in the developing countries-at least
in Latin America-is there, in this writer's judgment, the security of investment that can support long-term economic growth through private
capital.
This is not to suggest that there are no more reasonable investment
opportunities in Latin America. But it seems probably that future investments in Latin America will be either the kind that is designed to be in
and out within five years, or the kind that relies for its profits on activities
outside the host countries-so called downstream profits. And the more
investment that takes this form, the more support is likely to arise for those
7
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who will say "we told you so" in their attacks on capitalism and foreign
exploitation.
It may be that the pendulum will swing the other way, as seems to be the
case in Brazil today. But as long as the pendulum is swinging, the prospects
seem dim for stable long-term investments that create both useful economic activity for the receiving country and an adequate rate of return for the
investor. Only when the pendulum stops swinging, as is perhaps the case in
Mexico today, will we be able to make a realistic assessment of the role of
private enterprise in the future of the hemisphere.
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